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Determining whether the current situation of Latin America is better described as 
“post-neoliberalism” or as “commodities consensus” requires an analysis of recent 
changes in the region. Capitalism has expanded in agriculture and mining, accentuating 
the preeminence of basic exports. Traditional industry is declining, and remittances and 
tourism have increased in importance. Local capitalists associated with foreign corpora-
tions have replaced the national bourgeoisie, while the exodus of peasants consolidates 
labor precariousness, poverty, and inequality. At the same time, the United States is 
deploying troops to reorganize its domination. The South American rebellions have lim-
ited neoliberal aggression and achieved unusual victories in other parts of the world. The 
concept of post-neoliberalism emphasizes the region’s political turn toward autonomy but 
overlooks the persistence of the economic model generated during the previous phase. The 
opposing concept, commodities consensus, highlights the extractivism prevailing through-
out the region but plays down the extreme divergences among right-wing, center-left, and 
radical governments in all other areas. Both concepts contain part of the truth, but neither 
fully explains the regional scenario.
Para determinar si la situación actual de Latinoamérica es mejor descrita como “post-
neoliberalismo” o como un “consenso de los commodities” hay que hacer un análisis de 
los cambios recientes en la región. El capitalismo se ha expandido en la agricultura y la 
minería, acrecentando la preeminencia de las exportaciones básicas. La industria tradicio-
nal ha disminuido, y la importancia del turismo y las remesas ha aumentado. Los capi-
talistas locales asociados con empresas extranjeras han reemplazado a la burguesía 
nacional, mientras que el éxodo de los campesinos ha consolidado la precariedad laboral, 
la pobreza y la desigualdad. Al mismo tiempo, Estados Unidos despliega tropas para reor-
ganizar su dominio. Las rebeliones en América del Sur han puesto barreras a la agresión 
neoliberal y logrado victorias inusuales en otras partes del mundo. El concepto del post-
neoliberalismo destaca el giro político de la región hacia la autonomía pero con una ten-
dencia a la persistencia del modelo económico generado durante la fase anterior. El otro 
concepto, el consenso de las commodities, destaca el extractivismo que prevalece en toda 
la región pero minoriza las divergencias entre los gobiernos de derecha, centro-izquierda 
y radicales en todas las demás áreas. Ambos conceptos son parcialmente ciertos, pero no 
explican totalmente el escenario regional.
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Has Latin America gained autonomy or reinforced its dependency in the 
past decade? Has it broadened or reduced its margin of sovereignty? Is it con-
fronting the global economic crisis with strength or with increased vulnerabil-
ity? South America’s development provides many arguments for an increase in 
autonomy and that of Central America for a diagnosis of dependency. From a 
geopolitical viewpoint, the increase of independence in the region is apparent, 
but dependency is foregrounded when economics is emphasized. The concept 
of “post-neoliberalism” highlights the new phase’s independent foreign rela-
tions, proliferation of progressive governments, and retreat of the right (Sader, 
2013). The concept of “commodities consensus” highlights its uniform rein-
forcement of models focused on the export of primary goods (Svampa, 2013). 
Determining the correct characterization demands the evaluation of the great 
economic, social, and political transformations occurring in the region during 
the past two decades.
The economy and classes
agro-exporTs and mining
The neoliberal restructuring of Latin America since the 1980s has consolidated 
a pattern of export specialization that recreated the international role of the region 
as a provider of basic products. This renewed focus on commodities has involved 
a profound transformation in agriculture based on the promotion of export crops 
at the expense of local supply. A sector that manages rural businesses with capi-
talist criteria of intensive accumulation was strengthened in all countries. The old 
oligarchy led this conversion in close partnership with agribusiness. Small pro-
ducers experienced increasing costs of supplies, greater competitive pressure, 
and increasing transfer of risks through contracts that conformed to the rules of 
export. They had to adapt their activities to new demands for refrigeration, trans-
port, and agro-chemical inputs to generate products suitable for global market-
ing. They frequently went into debt, sold their land, and ended up joining the 
masses of the excluded in migrating to the city.
The pressure to increase profits undermines the memory of noncapitalist 
agriculture and dilutes the old discussions about the articulation of different 
modes of production in this sector. Under the discipline imposed by foreign 
demand, the line between the primary and the secondary sector is blurred, and 
the influence of wage labor is expanded by Taylorist methods. Soy is a typical 
example of this new agricultural scheme. It has spread to Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay, displacing other crops, through a transgenic model of 
direct cultivation and dependence on Monsanto as a provider of seeds. Since it 
does not require much labor to produce oil or animal feed, it generates only one 
job per 100–500 hectares (Katz, 2008). Similarly, the fruit and wine of Chile are 
being produced with new parameters for the foreign market, increasing rural 
concentration and the subcontracting of temporary workers. The flowers of 
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Ecuador and Colombia are being cultivated with intensive irrigation tech-
niques and heavy exploitation of female labor, displacing traditional food pro-
duction. The new winter vegetables of the Central American plantations are 
being exported at the expense of traditional production and have already gen-
erated a dramatic increase in imports of basic food products (Robinson, 2008).
The same specialization in primary exports is seen in mining with the new 
open-cast methods, which blow up mountains to extract minerals and dissolve 
rock with chemicals (fracking). Since these techniques require greater invest-
ment than excavation, the presence of foreign companies has increased, and 
they are reaping substantial profits because low-cost Canadian corporations—
combined with Australian, Belgian, Swedish, and U.S. companies—control the 
majority of these enterprises. Chile is a paradise for this activity. Copper is no 
longer extracted by the state company CODELCO; other companies also par-
ticipate, paying low taxes (7.8 percent) and obtaining extremely high yields (50 
percent). The same is occurring in Peru, which has developed a huge project in 
the Conga region (Gudynas, 2012; Hernández, 2013). The use of enormous 
amounts of water in this kind of mining affects agricultural projects and 
increases pollution. The environmental calamities that the region suffers, with 
the disappearance of the Andean glaciers, the desertification of the Amazonian 
basin, and coastal flooding, are being exacerbated by these activities. 
Extractivism for export heightens all the effects of climate change (CEPAL, 
2010).
The decline of indusTry
The decline of industry is the other side of the rise of agricultural exports and 
mining. The contribution of the secondary sector to Latin America’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) decreased from 12.7 percent in 1970–1974 to 6.4 per-
cent in 2002–2006, and the gap with Asian industry in production, productivity, 
technology, patent registrations, and investment and development costs wid-
ened (Rodríguez, 2012). While this decline is frequently identified with the 
“re-primarization” of the Latin American economy, industry has not disap-
peared but has been adapted to a new dependent reproductive cycle. The 
decline is very evident in Brazil and Argentina, the two economies that are 
most representative of postwar industrialization. In Brazil productivity is 
decreasing and costs and the external industrial deficit are increasing in a con-
text of stalled investment and deteriorating energy and transport infrastruc-
tures. Some analysts estimate that Brazilian industry is half what it was in the 
1980s (Palma, 2012).The same decline is evident in Argentine industry, despite 
the recovery recorded in the past decade. This sector is less important than in 
the 1980s (reduced from 23 percent to 17 percent of GDP) and is highly concen-
trated in five areas, with foreign predominance, increasing imports, and little 
inclusion of domestic components (Katz, 2010).
In Mexico, traditional industry—instituted during import substitution to 
supply the local market—has been replaced by the rise of maquilas in the free-
trade zones. This type of factory operates in a hierarchy of exports and func-
tions through networks that are adapted to the norms of flexible accumulation. 
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Maquilas began with clothing and electronics and expanded to automotive 
assembly, and today they represent 20 percent of Mexico’s GDP. The emblem-
atic location of this model is on the border with the United States. The 50 initial 
plants in 1965 had multiplied to 3,000 by 2004 (Robinson, 2008: 107–111). 
Developing into assembly plants with reduced labor requirements, these facto-
ries have many characteristics of the basic specialization that affects the entire 
Latin American economy, whose main requirement is a cheap labor force. 
Companies profit from the recruitment of workers from rural areas and crimi-
nalize the organization of labor unions. While productivity is similar to the 
levels prevailing in the company headquarters, wages are many times lower 
than the U.S. average and those in the unionized sector of Mexico. Labor exploi-
tation is more visible in the new generation of companies located in the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras, where young people on con-
tract are subjected to severe discipline. The pressure to increase productivity is 
constantly reinforced by Asian competition.
remiTTances and Tourism
The model of specialization in basic exports creates little employment, 
increases migration, and has generated a new type of dependence on remit-
tances in the region’s small countries. Latin America is the greatest receiver of 
these funds, which constitute the main income of the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua and 
the second-largest source of income of Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, and Surinam. Remittances have replaced the primacy of coffee in El 
Salvador and bananas in Honduras.1 With these remittances, an unprecedented 
situation of income’s being produced in one country and consumed in another 
is established. The waged labor force of one country supports the reproduction 
of its counterpart in another. Global communication and cheaper transportation 
have created a multinational space of people who live in two worlds simultane-
ously because of the connection of the immigrant with his place of origin, estab-
lishing a dual pattern of life in some communities (Anderson, 1994). This process 
widens the gap between countries that export their excess population and the 
economies that selectively absorb it. The movements are multidirectional, but 
the regions abandoned and the desired destinations are always the same, as the 
30 million Latinos currently living in the United States demonstrate.
Tourism has also become vital for the survival of the region’s small coun-
tries. It has displaced bananas as the principal export of Costa Rica and is the 
second-largest activity in Honduras, Guatemala, and the Caribbean. Latin 
America has become attractive for its cheap labor force, favorable natural envi-
ronments, and valued cultural patrimony. Neoliberal capitalism replaces the 
old rules of social tourism with individualistic criteria that naturalize the divi-
sion between rich (with the right to rest) and poor (with the obligation to serve). 
The media highlight the attraction of the exotic, homogenize culture, and turn 
the Third World into a “periphery of pleasure.” The middle class has access to 
these new experiences, internalizing the myths of free trade without noticing 
the growing inequality that surrounds this business. In reviving racism and 
elitism global tourism has had a very significant ideological impact.
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The persisTence of The model
Neoliberal globalization has created an economy focused on agro-exports, 
mining, and services at the expense of industrial development, and what is 
noteworthy about this is the continuity of these trends throughout the recent 
global crisis. This persistence is due to the global financial disturbance in the 
region. Both in the period previous to the crisis (2003–2008) and in the period 
following it (2008–2013), the Latin American growth rate has stayed above the 
international average, which has been declining in recent years and was around 
3.2 percent in 2013 compared with 3 percent the previous year (Rubinzal, 2013; 
Ugarteche, 2013). Compared with the devastating collapses experienced 
between 1980 and 2003, up until now the crisis has had a limited effect on Latin 
America. There have been no bank failures or explosions of foreign debt. This 
neutrality is more pronounced in the South than in the center of the region, but 
it distinguishes the region in this regard from the heavily affected core coun-
tries. The contrast with the 1930 Depression is telling. During that collapse, 
Latin American exports declined by 65 percent and imports by 37 percent, 
while the bulk of the countries suffered financial collapse that forced them to 
suspend payments on their foreign debts. This decline was reversed with the 
increase of exports and reserve accumulation that accompanied World War II 
(Guerra, 2006: 163–165).
The continuity of the export specialization model has also been facilitated 
by the high prices of commodities. These rates fell in 2008 but recovered rap-
idly. The improvement of exchange rates has continued, with a tripling of raw 
materials prices recorded in the past decade. Oil doubled its price, while the 
price of copper rose by five times and that of soy by two and a half times. This 
appreciation in turn led to an increase of 55 percent in export volume (Arriazu, 
2013). Explanations of this increase in prices include the impact of speculative-
financial activity, the expansion of agro-fuels, and the demand from China. 
Whatever its cause, it has led to the deepening of the preceding neoliberal 
transformations.
Finally, increased foreign investment has contributed to the continuity of the 
model. These inflows totaled US$173 billion in 2012, 6 percent more than the 
previous year and matching the amounts of the beginning of the past decade. 
Capital received and the value of exports facilitated the increase of reserves and 
a reduction of the ratio of indebtedness (Naim, 2013). The retreat of recent 
decades and the crisis period corroborates the diagnosis of the centrality of 
commodities in Latin American economies. Because of this focus the region 
may seem less vulnerable with regard to the balance of payments, reserves, and 
debt but is increasingly fragile structurally.
changes from above
The consolidation of the region as an exporter of basic products has also 
impacted the profile of the ruling classes, reinforcing the conversion of the old 
national bourgeoisie into a local bourgeoisie. The former consisted of industri-
alists producing for the domestic market with tariff protection and subsidies 
that favored the expansion of demand. The latter is a sector that is no longer 
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limited to manufacturing or self-centered development. It promotes exports 
more than the domestic market and prefers the reduction of costs to an increase 
of consumption. This change has increased the prosperity of a millionaire elite. 
The fortunes of Slim (Mexico), Cisneros (Venezuela), Noboa (Ecuador), Santo 
Domingo (Colombia), Andrónico Lucski (Chile), Bulgheroni and Rocca 
(Argentina), and Lemann, Safra, and Moraer (Brazil) have registered a great 
increase with the export business of recent decades.
Latin American capitalists constitute a minority of the population, and there 
is an enormous disproportion between their power and their numbers. Property 
owners and recipients of corporate profits are fewer than 1–2 percent of the 
economically active population and only 10 percent if executives and managers 
are included (Portes, 2004: 15–21). The reconversion of the past few decades has 
increased the concentration and internationalization of the main capitalists, 
consolidated as regionalized conglomerates. New “multi-Latinas” (corpora-
tions based on wealthy families that have expanded their companies) with 
global management and regional priorities emerged. The conglomerates of 
Brazil and Mexico led this trend, followed by those of Argentina and Chile.
The traditional diversity among agricultural and mining, industrial, and 
banking fractions has not disappeared, but their interrelationships have 
increased as a result of the strong competitive pressure introduced by neolib-
eral globalization. Their rivalry has altered the composition of the main 500 
Latin American corporations. Between 1991 and 2001, the proportion of state 
companies declined from 20 percent to 9 percent (Santiso, 2008). Local groups 
reorganized their activities with major foreign financing and market capitaliza-
tion. Income to stock markets coincided with an increase in outstanding shares 
in the so-called developing countries (from US$80 billion in 1981 to US$5 tril-
lion in 2005). The penetration of the structure of Latin American companies by 
foreign capital increased in this way (Santiso, 2008).
Companies are more powerful than before, but the region’s capitalist class 
remains in a secondary position globally and has lost ground to its new Asian 
competitors. This outcome is congruent with the specialization in the basic 
branches that has made the industrial gap with Southeast Asia unbridgeable. 
The local bourgeoisie has strengthened its ties with foreign capital but has 
remained a differentiated segment. It maintains aspirations of accumulation 
that go beyond the national context toward a regional scenario. Bourgeoisies 
that are more associated with foreign companies have developed, supporting 
a process that began in the 1960s in Brazil, continued in the 1980s in Argentina, 
and became consolidated in Mexico in the 1990s. This sector abandoned its 
industrial beginnings and extended into agro-exports, mining, and services.2 
The recent incorporation of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina into the G20 marks 
another leap in the relationship of current bourgeoisies to foreign capital, but it 
is a relationship of antagonistic cooperation that combines the strengthening of 
connections with the maintenance of differences between the North and the 
South (see Marini, 1985). Although business with foreign capital has multi-
plied, the country of origin persists as the base of operations, the privileged 
source of profits, and the center of decision making of the local bourgeoisie. The 
internationalization of credit, markets, and share ownership does not override 
the local territorial character of the major capitalist groups. The local and 
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associated bourgeoisie that leads export specialization, sharing benefits with 
foreign companies, does not constitute a “new oligarchy.” The precapitalist 
features that characterize this sector have been extinguished with the advance 
of capitalization. The old Latin American elites—who used archaic methods of 
exploitation and domination to exploit their agricultural and mining proper-
ties—have lost their importance. Some approaches emphasize the transnational 
character of the dominant groups that have opted for globalization of their 
businesses (see Robinson, 2008: 176–178), but this view confuses association 
with fusion, forgetting that internationalization unfolds on the basis of existing 
classes and states. Neoliberal globalization does not annul these structures or 
the priority given relationships among capitalists of the same national origin. 
Full transnationalization is for the moment limited to the cosmopolitan man-
agement sectors or fractions of the top bureaucracies of global organizations. 
At the same time, the property of corporations continues rooted in different 
geographical areas, and nation-states remain the only instrument with some 
legitimacy to discipline workers.
Local Latin American bourgeoisies are not satellites manipulated by the 
metropolis. They are capitalist classes that combine the usufruct of agro-exports 
and mining income with the surplus value extracted from workers, and they 
act as dominant classes rather than as parasitic collectors of tribute for foreign 
capital. Their inability to develop the region does not imply any lack of interest 
in that goal. The Latin American economy is governed by patterns of competi-
tion, investment, and exploitation. Since these patterns differ significantly from 
pillage, it is a simplification to use the term “lumpen-bourgeoisie” to portray 
the bourgeoisie (see Frank, 1979, for the origin of this error). This designation 
applies only to sectors that accumulate capital on the margins of the legal cir-
cuit. Narcotrafficking, for example, produces criminal fortunes and launders 
some of its income through financial or productive activities, but it is a mar-
ginal sector that is not integrated into the stable club of the dominant. It is also 
erroneous to generalize the situations of small enclaves. Latin America consti-
tutes an analytical unit, but characteristics referring to Honduras or Panama 
are not valid for Brazil. Only in the former cases can we speak of “neocolonial 
bourgeoisies” remotely controlled by Washington.
The turn toward commodities defines the profile of Latin American oppres-
sors: they are the capitalists who exploit wage labor, the bourgeois who politi-
cally suppress workers, and the dominators who ideologically subordinate the 
dominated, performing the same functions as their counterparts in other parts 
of the planet. But they also suffer from the weakness of a sector that has not led 
national struggles or co-opted staff that is important to its domination and has 
not facilitated the mobility of the middle classes, and this weakness has 
increased under the new model of export specialization.
changes from below
The transformation of the Latin American social structure has also altered 
the configuration of the dominated classes. As an axis of this change, in agri-
culture we find the loss of cohesion of the old peasantry, affected by the grow-
ing exodus to the urban centers. The old landed estate (latifundio) that recreated 
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peasants’ misery and obstructed the development of an agrarian bourgeoisie 
has declined in the face of capitalist companies that take land from farmers, hire 
precarious wage labor, and force migration to the cities. This displacement has 
swelled the masses of excluded urban residents with little work and negligible 
income, given the scarcity of employment options for the surplus population. 
As a result, informality has become the norm for the extractive economies 
under both recession and prosperity. Out-migration, which was the escape 
valve for imbalances of European accumulation at various points in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, provides only limited relief. Young people in 
the region are not finding employment either in their own countries or abroad. 
One direct consequence of this exclusion is the exponential increase of crime. 
The narco-economy has become a refuge of survival for sectors pushed into 
marginality. The region has the highest rate of homicide in the world. 
Delinquency increases with the social divide and the obscene promotion of the 
consumption and the pleasures that the wealthy enjoy.
Since the extractive model creates low-quality jobs, labor precariousness is 
higher in Latin America than the average in the core countries. Informality is 
no longer recreated in precapitalist agrarian circuits or in the family reproduc-
tion of the labor force. It is expanding with the penetration of capitalism into all 
spheres of social life. Some studies estimate that the precarious sector includes 
46 percent of Latin American workers (Portes, 2004: 113–149). Another key fact 
is the extension of poverty beyond the informal sector to a broad segment of 
stable workers. In contrast to the situation in most developed economies, the 
universe of individuals with incomes that do not satisfy basic needs is not lim-
ited to the excluded but extends to the exploited workers of modern compa-
nies. The percentage of poor children (45 percent of the total) is telling of the 
magnitude of this scourge (CEPAL-UNICEF, 2010).
In the regional manufacturing scenario, the acceleration of technological 
change increases segmentation between skilled and unskilled workers. Stable 
employment with social protection declines in comparison with contract jobs 
without any protection. The magnitude of this gap is the outstanding charac-
teristic of the labor market. The typical postwar male unionized operator is 
being replaced by the more flexibilized female worker. The decline in formal 
employment is enormous in the maquilas. The expansion of the industrial 
working class has lost its momentum; while the industrial proletariat persists, 
its incidence has declined.
The traditional Latin American middle class is smaller than those of advanced 
countries and provides a very meager cushion in the abyss that separates the 
wealthy from the impoverished. In addition, the middle class now includes 
fringes of small vendors and the self-employed, while professionals and highly 
qualified technicians are few. This underdevelopment is consistent with the 
weakness of industry. The middle sectors have broadened their consumption 
with the extension of credit, advertising, and the emergence of large commer-
cial chains, but in economies that are so tied to the export of basic products the 
productive foundations of purchasing power are very fragile.
Many analysts highlight the reduction of poverty, unemployment, and 
inequality during the past decade without noting the limited improvement in 
economic activity. The generalization of social assistance to temper poverty has 
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only transitionally protected the helpless without attacking the causes of the 
problem. Social assistance plans coexist with precariousness and validate labor 
segmentation. At the same time, the slight reduction in inequality has not 
changed the region’s position at the top of global rankings of inequality. The 
Gini coefficient, which measures this polarization (51.6), exceeds the global 
average (39.5), is twice the average of the advanced economies, and includes 
the four countries at the top of the global barometer (Colombia, Bolivia, 
Honduras, and Brazil). The income of the richest 20 percent of Latin Americans 
is almost 20 times that of the poorest 20 percent (Guillemi, 2012).
The current economic scenario—dominated by an ideology of export spe-
cialization—does not corroborate a “post-neoliberal” diagnosis, but the oppos-
ing thesis, incorporating the political dimension, must also be evaluated.
blocs and governmenTs
The geopolitical alignments in Latin America are conditioned by the actions 
of the United States, which has strengthened its presence in Central America 
and maintained its influence on South America.
coercion To recover hegemony
The United States maintains its influence by deploying military forces. The 
Southern Command in Miami, which supervises this control, has more civilian 
personnel devoted to Latin America than any other department assigned to the 
area in Washington. The preeminence of the Pentagon was heightened with the 
installation of seven large bases in Colombia. State terrorism has operated in 
that country for decades, along with the assassination of union leaders and the 
forced displacement of peasants.
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and 
other secret agencies also actively participate in social conflict that has left more 
than 60,000 dead in Mexico. They have taken advantage of this conflict to 
design plans for militarization (Plan ASPAN in 2005, Plan Mérida in 2007), 
intervene in the modernization of the armed forces, and influence the imposi-
tion of counterinsurgency laws. They have even negotiated with the cartels 
behind the backs of the local authorities and fueled the ideology of fear used to 
justify the everyday action of the police (Cascante, 2011; Fazio, 2012). This inter-
ference develops under the hypocritical cover of the war on drugs, which con-
ceals the prominent role of the United States as market and financial shelter for 
narcotrafficking. The banks of the country launder 70 percent of the funds gen-
erated by that business. Under U.S. vigilance, Colombia persists as the princi-
pal regional producer and Peru has increased its share by 55 percent in the past 
decade (Berterretche, 2010). The same Yankee presence is evident in the war 
against the criminal gangs of Central America (maras). Their persecution is 
used to oppress the poor and carry out executions in the slums. The Pentagon 
has multiplied its military installations in the colonies in the Caribbean (the 
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico) in close association with the Netherlands (Curaçao) 
and France (Martinique) (Reverón, 2013).
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All of these facts refute the naive belief in the “loss of U.S. interest in Latin 
America” or in the imminent “abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine.” A nota-
ble discrepancy exists between the notion of withdrawal and the growing 
imperial presence in the entire area. Since the embarkation of the Fourth Fleet 
(dissolved in 1950 and reinstated in 2008), the total of military personnel trained 
by the Pentagon has exceeded the average of previous decades (195,807 in 
1999–2011). Military-police assistance involves extremely large sums (US$6.8 
billion in 2009–2013), and treaties for sharing sensitive information have 
increased in number. The United States maintains 4,000 permanently deployed 
uniformed personnel for emergency action. Its drones operate without any 
restriction throughout the hemisphere (Tokatlian, 2013).
The central geopolitical function of Latin America for the empire has not 
changed, and neither has the management of this supremacy with instruments 
of coercion and consensus. This strategy has always implied a complementary 
bipartisan agreement on sticks (Eisenhower, Reagan, Bush Sr. and Jr.) and car-
rots (Clinton, Carter), without rigid distinctions between Republicans and 
Democrats. Obama is gently attempting to rectify the damage done by the 
unsuccessful Bush wars.
The margin for direct action of the U.S. Marines has been cut back in Latin 
America since the failure of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the 
decline of the Organization of American States (OAS), and the emergence of 
organizations that are distanced from the imperial mandate such as the Unión 
de Naciones Suramericanos (Union of South American Nations—UNASUR) 
and the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States—CELAC). The Yankee embassy has lost 
influence in various countries of South America, spying generates unprece-
dented protests, and two whistleblowers about these activities have been 
offered asylum in the region (Edward Snowden by Venezuela and Julian 
Assange by Ecuador). The Yankee attempt to punish these reactions by putting 
on “hold” the flight of the president of Bolivia did not produce results.
Obama is attempting to reestablish the U.S. capacity for action that was char-
acteristic of the 1970s, following the path taken by Carter to temper the effects 
of the Vietnam War and Watergate. The United States is processing this adver-
sity with all the resources of the only power that disposes of capital at the global 
level. Its military supremacy gives it a big advantage over its European and 
Asian competitors.
sTraTegies and rivals
The natural resources of the South are the priority of the corporations of the 
North. The empire hungers for the minerals, oil, water, and forests of Latin 
America. The Department of State has these reserves mapped out and treasures 
data unknown to the rest of the hemisphere. It is no accident that 98 percent of 
the region’s communications go through some U.S. information center 
(Telégrafo, 2013). The economic interest of the first power in the rest of the hemi-
sphere has not declined. It remains at the top of the region’s ranking of foreign 
investment, and in 2012 its position was five times higher than in the preceding 
five-year period. Its exports exceed those to other areas (Tokatlian, 2013).
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The United States is not, however, without competitors in the region. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, Europe increased its presence in the region through Spain, 
whose conversion to the euro and globalization led to an unprecedented 
increase in the number of Spanish corporations in its old colonies. During the 
boom of privatizations, this investment was even greater than that of the United 
States. However, Spain’s future in the region is unknown. Since the explosion 
of the global crisis, Latin America has been the savior of many Iberian compa-
nies, which have financed their imbalances with transfers from subsidiaries 
located on the New Continent. This rescue has been combined with changes of 
ownership, and no one knows who will end up managing these companies. 
Europe continues negotiating free-trade treaties with the region, but the expec-
tation of a great Ibero-American market is subsiding. The mandates of the Old 
Continent dispute businesses but not the preeminence of the United States in 
the hemisphere.
The challenge that China poses is another story. In the past decade the Asian 
giant has become the great market for Latin American raw materials. It absorbs 
40 percent of these exports, and it has been estimated that each point of increase 
in China’s GDP draws 0.4 percent of its Latin American equivalent. The Asian 
power’s investments are also growing at an alarming rate: from US$15 billion 
in 2000 to US$200 billion in 2012 and an estimated US$400 billion by 2017. 
China is becoming a great source of credit. Between 2005 and 2011, it lent over 
US$75 billion, more than the United States and the World Bank (Hernández, 
2013). Although these loans were negotiated under better conditions, their 
main destination is mining, energy, or commodity projects that finance Latin 
American specialization in the provision of basic raw materials. China poses a 
commercial threat to U.S. supremacy, but it does not aspire to geopolitical con-
trol of the region. This is economic rivalry without the expectation of political-
military consequences.
Yankee acceptance of Asian presence even in areas that have been off-limits 
is striking. There are Chinese companies in Panama, and the construction of a 
new canal that will cross Nicaragua has been granted to Chinese contractors 
without unleashing a reaction by the Department of State. This tolerance illus-
trates the interest that U.S. companies also have in the expansion of maritime 
transactions with Asia.
The pacific’s counTeroffensive
U.S. strategic economic interest revolves around free-trade treaties. Of the 20 
agreements of this type that it has entered into around the world, half are 
located in Latin America. Its effort to create a great market without barriers for 
the companies of the North with the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
failed in 2005 because of the resistance deployed by various countries. The 
great bazaar that Washington promoted to manage exports from Alaska to 
Tierra del Fuego could not be solidified. To replace the failed hemispheric 
agreement, it began to negotiate bilateral accords, and it is now attempting 
another step with the Pacific Alliance, which it is promoting through presiden-
tial visits and promises of all kinds. It has already set up a bloc with Peru, 
Mexico, Chile, and Colombia, is preparing to add Panama and Costa Rica, and 
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is tempting Uruguay and Paraguay with observer status (Morgenfeld, 2013). 
These accords seek to increase U.S. sales to markets that become captives as 
tariff liberalization destroys local competitiveness. They also strengthen the 
mining-oil specialization model to ensure the supply of raw materials to Yankee 
companies. In addition, the Pacific Alliance is conceived as a bridge with the 
two giant agreements that the United States is promoting with 28 nations of the 
European Union (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and 11 
Asian countries (the Trans-Pacific Partnership). These agreements are molded 
to the necessities of the most globalized corporations, which manufacture in 
various locations and profit from the mobility of capital and goods.
At the geopolitical level, the Pacific Alliance seeks to neutralize any project 
for Latin American autonomy. This is why scattered free-trade agreements are 
being replaced by an articulated plan for a regional bloc. Mexico is the most 
advanced example of this strategy. In the two decades of operation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the country has been transformed 
into a platform of oil and maquilas for the U.S. market. The neoliberals cele-
brate this assimilation, spreading implausible images of progress that obscure 
the break-up of the Mexican economy (see Cárdenas, 2013; Oppenheimer, 
2013). The industry that Mexico forged under import substitution has been 
dismantled. For every dollar that is exported to the United States there are 40 
cents of imports from it, more than from Canada and suggesting absolute sub-
mission. The formality of a tripartite treaty conceals an association between 
two powerful nations that subordinates the Latin member. Mexico sells 90 per-
cent of its products to its neighbor, has its natural riches tied to this market, and 
drains manpower for unskilled jobs on the other side of the border (Echeverría, 
2012). This dependency extinguishes the autonomy of foreign policy that 
Mexico exhibited in the 1960s, when it maintained diplomatic relations with 
Cuba, challenging the rest of the continent. NAFTA dictates the erasure of the 
memory of the enormous territorial confiscation that the United States imposed 
on its neighbor during the nineteenth century.
The Mexican elite bourgeoisie participates in the agreement with the North 
by expanding its enterprises. It has developed huge internationalized corpora-
tions and shares the top of the regional ranking with its Brazilian counterpart. 
Of the 100 local companies of the region, these two countries account for 85 and 
for 35 of the 50 most profitable. The influence of Cemex, Alfa, Modelo, Telmex, 
and Bimbo is very important, as is the power achieved by Carlos Slim, who has 
positioned himself among the global multimillionaires (Santiso, 2008).
The small Central American countries are very different. They do not have 
middle-sized or semiperipheral economies and have few capitalist groups inte-
grated with large businesses. Instead of generating a Slim empire, the insig-
nificant Honduran bourgeoisie recreates the trajectory of the banana elites, and 
its counterparts in Panama are limited to profiting from the mediation of the 
canal and of commerce in the free-trade zones.
The varieTies of The righT
The majority of governments that participate in the Pacific bloc are rightist, 
and this is no accident. They are subordinated to the United States, encourage 
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militarization, and have adapted to neoliberalism. The two terms of the Partido 
Acción Nacional (2000–2012) and the new presidency of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico are examples of this congruence. 
Enrique Peña Nieto combined old practices of electoral manipulation to achieve 
the presidency with the support of Televisa. He is disposed to implement the 
counterreform agenda demanded by the ruling class on the energy, fiscal, and 
educational levels. To privatize PEMEX he has repealed the constitutional 
amendment that prevents contracts with private companies, destroying the 
nationalized company that symbolized Cárdenas’s achievement. He will seek 
to finance the eventual decline of fiscal income that this reversion will entail 
with an increase in the value-added tax. Public transport costs will rise, the 
electricity sector will be dismantled, and teachers’ rights will be subjugated 
(Aguilar, 2013).
Colombia is a second case of close association between right-wing govern-
ments and free-trade associations. Its political-military alignment with the 
United States was instrumental in the reactionary leadership personified by 
Álvaro Uribe. He terrorized the peasants, preserved the privileges of the land-
owners, facilitated the violence of the paramilitaries, and revived the anticom-
munist ideology of the Pentagon. His successor, Juan Manuel Santos, is 
pursuing the same objectives, but he has reopened the failed negotiations with 
the insurgency. In a more urbanized society, with ruling classes bent on 
expanding the frontier of mining and agribusiness, the end of hostilities is the 
key to new investment. The old landed elite opposes this, and the government 
plays both ends, maintaining repression and negotiating an agreement that 
validates the concentration of land, which creates displacement and destroys 
communities.
Chile constitutes a third example of the connection between free-trade trea-
ties and right-wing regimes. Both processes were recreated through the 
Pinochet constitution, which converted the Christian Democrats and social 
democrats to the neoliberal creed. The Concertación guaranteed the privileges 
of the armed forces (10 percent of the profits of the state-owned copper com-
pany), a level of inequality exceeding the regional average, and a crippling debt 
system for pursuing higher education. The postdictatorship period has been 
characterized by repression, poverty, and low union membership.3 In her sec-
ond term, Michelle Bachelet promises to do what she omitted in her first. She 
says that she will limit the privatization of education and broaden state par-
ticipation in a system of private pensions, but the enormous abstention associ-
ated with her electoral victory (59 percent of those registered) illustrates the 
mistrust that exists about the realization of these measures. Any step taken will 
be subject to the restrictive filter of the constitution.
Peru has also stayed aligned with the rightist free-trade bloc. The current 
president, Ollanta Humala, continues the trajectory of explicitly neoliberal 
(Alejandro Toledo) or nationalist (Alan García) governments that doubled 
repression to expand mega-mining. His progressive promises were diluted 
once he became president. He has quashed social protest, frozen wages, and 
violated labor rights. He has incorporated shady characters into his administra-
tion and authorized the massive presence of U.S. military personnel. His 
behavior is a political travesty.
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In the small Central American countries, the political restriction generated 
by the free-trade agreements is overwhelming. These republics carry a history 
of subjugation to U.S. power that has been renewed with remittances and out-
migration. The privatizing presidents of Panama, Guatemala, and Costa Rica 
have reinforced this dependence to an unprecedented extreme.
an insTiTuTional Tendency Toward coups
The right has managed to recycle its preeminence in the pro–North American 
bloc through successive elections. These elections do not threaten the privileges 
of the affluent or imply any real exercise of democracy. In the few cases of elec-
toral mandates that threatened powerful minorities there were attempted 
coups, this time in institutional disguise. The legislature, the media, and the 
U.S. government promoted these efforts. Three cases illustrate this modality.
In Haiti President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was arrested and expatriated in 
2004, and the presidencies that followed were in the hands of figures who were 
permeable to the interests of the foreign occupation forces. Under this cover, 
foreign corporations have profited from the humanitarian tragedy that the 
island has faced since the earthquake, making money from the simple removal 
of debris. The danger of famine hovers over a country that was food-sufficient 
in 1972 and now imports 82 percent of its consumption (rice) (Colson, 2008). In 
addition, the foreign police forces introduced a cholera epidemic that resulted 
in 7,000 deaths. They manage the violations that Haitians endure on the border 
with the Dominican Republic and fail to protect the population from the crimes 
of narcotraffickers. It is estimated that 12 percent of the cocaine entering the 
United States passes through Haiti (Chalmers, 2013).
In Paraguay, the introduction of some mild changes was sufficient to set off 
a McCarthyite reaction against President Fernando Lugo in 2012. A sham par-
liament was assembled and his impeachment accomplished in a matter of days. 
The president who came after him (Horacio Cartes) is heavily involved in nar-
cotrafficking and contraband.
In Honduras a coup was perpetrated to bury Manuel Zelaya’s reforms and 
autonomous foreign policy. After a record number of assassinations, the perpe-
trators turned to fraud, buying votes, selling identification cards, and manipu-
lating certificates to impede the victory of the opposition coalition (Arkonada, 
2013).
The right also attempted failed coups against Hugo Chávez (the oil putsch), 
Evo Morales (the attempt at territorial secession), and Rafael Correa (the police 
rebellion). These failures illustrated the limits the reactionary project faces at 
the regional level and explain why conservative ideologues usually convey 
disenchantment rather than satisfaction (Sanguinetti, 2012). This frustration 
increased with the first year of the new pope, who is an important actor in 
regional politics. The right anticipates no repetition in Latin America of the 
crusade deployed by John Paul II in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. Francis 
has political instincts and recognizes that the conditions for reproducing that 
action do not exist, and therefore his messages are far from conventional rheto-
ric. Before adopting any foreign policy strategy, however, he will need to miti-
gate the corruption, pedophilia, and loss of adherents that the Church is 
experiencing.
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brazil’s ambivalence
The continued military influence of the United States, the free-trade counter-
offensive of the Pacific Alliance, and the variety of right-wing governments and 
coup plotters mark a scenario inconsistent with the concept of post-neoliberal-
ism. If the experience of this bloc were to constitute the only scenario in the 
region, it would confirm the validity of a commodities consensus. However, the 
complexity of Latin America lies in the coexistence of this articulation with a 
second geopolitical axis led by Brazil. This segment encourages capitalist 
regionalism with more autonomous political-economic strategies. The country 
that spearheads this strategy achieved a GDP of US$2.4 trillion in 2011 and is 
the leading Latin American economy. It has 14 multinational corporations of 
global reach and promotes foreign investment as part of a strategic plan, the 
Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America 
(IIRSA), with state financing from the Brazilian Development Bank (Armendariz, 
2011). Its role has its roots in the history of a country of continental dimensions. 
In contrast to that of Spanish America, its national development was not accom-
panied by territorial divisions. In the second half of the twentieth century it 
became a middle-sized economy with more extensive domestic markets and 
some diversity of exports. These characteristics are typical of semiperipheral 
status. The position of Brazil in the international division of labor—intermedi-
ate between the great powers and the periphery—is more like that of Spain 
than like that of Nicaragua or Ecuador.
The maintenance of this position demands a show of power. Brazil is mod-
ernizing its armed forces and rehearsing intervention in distant conflicts (the 
Middle East, Iran, Africa) and aspires to a permanent seat on the Security 
Council. No other Latin American nation is attempting to play at this level. At 
the same time, Brazil is shaping its foreign policy to achieve a particular hege-
monic coordination with the United States. On the one hand, it militarily pro-
tects the Amazon from the 23 bases that the Pentagon manages in the area. On 
the other hand, it directs the occupation of Haiti in total harmony with the U.S. 
Department of State. Its corporations are participating in the business of recon-
struction of the island, encouraging the creation of free-trade zones and disput-
ing export privileges (Borón, 2013a).
The duality of Brazilian foreign policy has innumerable examples. Dilma 
Rousseff avoided participating in the regional summit that repudiated the 
Yankee-European outrage against Bolivia’s presidential plane but also can-
celled a state visit with Obama to protest the shameless spying by the CIA. This 
intermediate path was recently ratified with the decision to purchase Swedish 
military planes instead of U.S. ones. The head-on collision that would have 
resulted from the choice of Russian or Chinese models was averted by opting 
for the Scandinavian equipment, which includes components from U.S. com-
panies.4 The same pendulum has described the diplomacy of Itamaraty in the 
past decade. In 2003–2011 distancing from the United States predominated, 
while in 2011–2013 there was a rapprochement that appears to have ended in 
recent months.
Brazil, unable to imitate other subpowers that have nuclear arsenals (such as 
Russia or India) or to deploy troops in its sphere of influence (as Turkey does), 
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is attempting to create its own space, installing a cushion that tempers U.S. 
pressures without entering into confrontation with the first power. It neither 
promotes a rupture with the empire nor accepts the neocolonial subordination 
of the Yankee mandate.
mercosur and unasur
Brazil and Argentina have been promoting the creation of a trade area with 
substantial participation of foreign companies but with its own tariff structure. 
Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, is intended to act as a unit in nego-
tiations with other blocs, but it has been unable to advance for the past two 
decades. While the United States is promoting the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur is 
in a stalemate. It has not taken any steps toward macroeconomic coordination. 
The differences in currency, types of exchange, and fiscal policies among its 
members are enormous. Proposals to reduce asymmetries between countries 
do not exist, and as industry declines there are no plans for manufacturing 
coordination or shared use of export profits. Its members sell the same products 
and individually prioritize soy and mega-mining, the latter absorbing 51 per-
cent of foreign investment in 2012 (CEPAL, 2012). The current paralysis is 
reviving old conflicts between Argentina and Brazil in terms of tariff norms and 
exchange restrictions. Investments have been suspended (Minera Vale in 
Argentina) and projects postponed (railroads). Under these conditions, 
Paraguay and Uruguay are open to the possibility of negotiating their own 
free-trade agreements, which would destroy Mercosur’s cohesion (Turzi, 2013).
Brazil’s uncertainties are smothering the association. It has more agreements 
outside the area than within South America and does not want to institutional-
ize regional agreements that obstruct its multilateralism. It is trying to maintain 
a dual role as exporter of raw materials to the rest of the world and as supplier 
of processed goods, but any initiative in the former area affects the expansion 
of the latter and vice versa. South American productive integration with 
regional funding for exchange stabilization, a common currency, and financing 
from the Banco del Sur would force Brazil to concentrate investment in the 
region to the detriment of its own international projection. Argentina illustrates 
the same tension between regional and global priorities on a lesser scale, dis-
tributing its exports across all continents.
Tendencies toward dissolution are also apparent in negotiating treaties with 
other blocs. The European Union is proposing a free-trade agreement that priv-
ileges exports from the Old Continent to avoid dealing with the agricultural 
protectionism that limits South American sales. The Europeans usually tempt 
officials of all governments with unilateral efforts so that they will enter into 
accords behind the backs of the other countries (Marchini, 2014).
The stalemate of Mercosur contrasts with the intense geopolitical activism of 
the South American bloc in recent years. There have never been so many pres-
idential meetings or events attended by leaders of the region. The new regional 
focus has emerged from the joint actions of the Rio Group in 2010, which gave 
rise to the UNASUR and the CELAC in 2011–2013. By assigning the rotating 
presidency of the CELAC to Cuba in 2013 it posed a strong challenge to the 
OAS. The coup that unseated Lugo also received rapid responses. Mercosur 
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suspended Paraguay and sped up Venezuela’s integration into the association. 
The UNASUR is an especially heterogeneous conglomerate, and the United 
States pressures it through its members. The organization includes various 
countries of the Pacific Alliance that have U.S. Marines in their territories.
The South American bloc lacks consistency as long as Brazil remains in the 
middle of the road, seeking support for its aspirations and rejecting any initia-
tive for integration. In the long term, however, it will be impossible to lead a 
project without bearing the costs of its realization. These contradictions have 
become stronger in recent years, with the privileges granted to the agro-export 
sector in competition with allied South American countries and to the detri-
ment of industry. In addition, the Brazilian option for soy locally affects the 
variety of crops of the coffee era and increases the traditional concentration of 
land. Only 10 percent of proprietors control 85 percent of the total value of 
agricultural production, and 50 corporations manage the entire trade. 
Dependence on fertilizers is extreme; the country’s share of world agricultural 
production is 5 percent, but it consumes 20 percent of the agro-chemicals. In 
this context, agricultural reform has been impeded, and 150,000 families con-
tinue to camp out waiting for land (Stedile, 2013).
Brazil cannot lead South American integration by repeating the prevailing 
model of extractivism with little manufacturing. Its economic influence 
emerged precisely with the opposite scheme of expanding manufacturing dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s. During the recent growth cycle (2006–2011) its rate of 
investment (17 percent of GDP) was less than the historical average, and the 
strong increase in the exchange rate additionally affected its competitiveness 
(Sampaio, 2012). Further, it has abandoned the consolidation of energy from 
hydroelectricity in favor of a dubious gamble on oil exploitation. It has also 
facilitated de-nationalization of the industry with its opening to foreign capital. 
Almost 300 companies have passed into foreign control since 2004, with great 
advantages for U.S. companies (3.4 times more firms than the French, German, 
or Japanese) (Chade, 2013; Lessa, 2013).
The recent measures adopted by Rousseff to prop up industry with subsidies 
funded by welfare provision have not reversed the decline of manufacturing. 
During the past decade, Brazil has chosen the expansion of consumption with-
out corresponding investment. More than 15 million Brazilians traveled by 
plane for the first time, and 42 million were incorporated into the banking sys-
tem. Credit has spread, and the minimum wage has recovered, but these con-
junctural improvements have not resolved the structural decline of industry 
(Nepomuceno, 2013). This vulnerability is heightened by the great flow of 
short-term capital, which tends to fly out of the country as fast as it comes in 
because of its financial performance. For the first time in a decade, 2013 ended 
with a dangerous deficit in the capital movements that have always tormented 
the Brazilian economy.
During the twentieth century, the Argentine economy followed steps similar 
to Brazil’s with opposite results. It predominated during agro-export liberal-
ism, lost ground in the import-substitution phase, and sharply declined under 
the financial recovery. One cannot even predict the final result of the neo-devel-
opmental efforts of the past decade, but the ruling class of Argentina no longer 
disputes hegemony with that of Brazil. In addition, Argentina is again facing 
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the classic tensions of its economy—very high inflation, currency imbalance, 
and fiscal downturn—but is for now not burdened with the debt levels that 
have led to periodic collapses. This return to stagnation is due to the persistence 
of an economy with structural imbalances. Argentina has resigned itself to pro-
ductive development based on state ownership of soy income, and the local 
bourgeoisie has returned to its practice of capital flight and increasing prices 
without investment. Under these conditions, the limits of a strategy based 
solely on demand became apparent.
The surprising cenTer-lefT
The current correspondence between Mercosur and center-right administra-
tions confirms the general correlation between regional blocs and types of gov-
ernment, but, just as with the free-trade–right pairing, relations are not strictly 
harmonious. Mercosur preceded the current governments and went through a 
long period of consolidation during the neoliberal zenith of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Carlos Menem, but the capitalist regionalism that it is attempting 
is more in line with the current governments, which accommodate to the social 
movements and have foreign policies more independent of the United States. 
Lulaism and Kirchnerism constitute two variants of this positioning while dif-
fering widely in political action.
During the past decade, the Workers’ Party disappointed those in Brazil who 
had expected a government that supported wage earners. The bulk of the party 
reflected the influence achieved by a strong and focused proletariat but one 
with scant experience and capacity to counter the assimilation to the bourgeois 
system that drove Lulaism. It remained part of the structure of the dominant 
classes and ensured the continuity without surprises that characterizes the 
country’s political regime. This conservative retrenchment fostered depolitici-
zation and generalized passive consensus and modified the government’s 
social base. The ordinary people of impoverished areas have replaced the 
working class, the middle class, and the intelligentsia as the support base of the 
current administration. The government has been guided by the principle of 
granting only those concessions that the ruling class accepts. Its norm has been 
to give something to those below without taking anything away from those 
above (Machado, 2013). This policy generates countless contradictions, but it is 
not neutral. It is aimed at the service of capital with some features of mild 
reformism. It has allowed a decade of bourgeois stability, undermining the 
legitimacy of the original workers’ project, and has survived by forming alli-
ances with the right and making ideological concessions to the establishment. 
Lulaism has followed the same trajectory as the social democratic parties.
Rousseff has developed her administration with that support, but recently 
she has confronted surprising street protests by angry young people. This enor-
mous mobilization had only two contemporary precedents: the struggles for 
direct elections in 1984 and for the impeachment of Fernando Collor in 1992. It 
shed light on the reality of the Brazilian people, who suffer from enormous 
inequality, the deterioration of transport, and the decline of public education. 
The Workers’ Party was disoriented by the mobilization, which revealed its 
alienation from the streets, and the right has sought to take advantage of this 
attrition.
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The wave of protests that shook Brazil is common practice in Argentina, and 
this is the main difference between the two. While Lulaism stressed demobili-
zation, the continuities of the 2001 rebellion forced Kirchnerism to govern with 
an eye on the reaction of the oppressed. This variant of Peronism was initially 
focused on restoring the traditional political system threatened by the people’s 
revolt while granting important social and democratic concessions to the bulk 
of the population, but it reestablished the power of the privileged. In contrast 
to Lula, who governed in a context of limited reforms and no pressure from 
below, the Kirchners operated in a quagmire. In contrast with the Workers’ 
Party, which maintained the structure transferred from Cardoso almost intact, 
they reconstructed a collapsed state.
This difference also determined the implementation of different economic 
policies. Argentina attempted a neo-developmental scheme with increasing 
state regulation to restore a devastated domestic market. In Brazil, in contrast, 
the initial socio-liberal continuity was gradually replaced by guarded interven-
tion aimed at counteracting the erosion provoked by monetary orthodoxy. 
Kirchnerism was based on presidential leadership, the arbitration of executive 
power, and the influence of semi-institutional organizations. This informal 
political model adopted some of the neo-populist methods of classic Peronism, 
in contrast to the negotiated institutionalism that continued to prevail in Brazil. 
Both Kirchnerism and Lulaism have sought to neutralize the leading role of 
unions and the working class but by different paths. The two governments 
belong to the same species of center-left and have resorted to the same progres-
sive rhetoric. The Kirchners resumed the project of mixing Peronism with the 
social-democratic variant anticipated by Raúl Alfonsín, while Lula and Dilma 
transformed the Workers’ Party into a typical party of the ruling order. 
Kirchnerism is confronting a new decline that has prevented Cristina from 
selecting the next president as Lula did with Dilma. The right is preparing to 
lead a 2015 change of mandate, but it fears the repetition of the stormy presi-
dential transition that has been the norm in Argentina and the exception in 
Brazil.
These scenarios confirm that the prevailing neoliberal context since the 1990s 
has been replaced by the incidence of the new autonomous South American 
bloc. The post-neoliberal thesis highlights this change while the opposing view 
minimizes it. Clarification of the problem requires evaluating another aspect: 
social struggle and radicalism.
rebellions and projecTs
The beginning of the new century brought great social rebellions in South 
America that changed the scenario on which neoliberalism was based. These 
uprisings placed a limit on the offensive of capital and the right’s efforts to bury 
the revolutionary ascent of the 1970s.
far-reaching revolTs
The four victorious uprisings were located in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela between 2000 and 2005. They were massive rebellions amidst 
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great political crises, including a power vacuum, the retreat of repressive forces, 
the defeat of reaction, and confusion among the ruling classes. Presidents iden-
tified with neoliberalism were expelled from office, and programs of privatiza-
tion, free trade, and labor flexibilization lost social support. These disturbances 
influenced other countries (Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Colombia) that did not 
have demonstrations of the same magnitude.
The rebellions did not reach the dimensions of the great social revolutions of 
the twentieth century (Mexico in 1910, Bolivia in 1952, Cuba in 1959, and 
Nicaragua in 1979). The old states persisted, the people’s power remained lim-
ited, and there were no military outcomes. However, they were strong enough 
to revive national and democratic demands, updating anti-imperialist tradi-
tions and in some cases reintroducing the socialist horizon. They went far 
beyond the basic stages of social protest, improved conditions for grassroots 
victories, and defeated the dominators. These results have not been seen in 
other parts of the world. The rebellions changed the social relations of power 
and limited the aggression that big capital had initiated with the dictatorships 
and bloody wars to destroy the heroic deeds inaugurated by the Cuban 
Revolution. At the same time, they affected the economic situation. While they 
did not reverse the regressive trend of these changes, they undermined their 
stability, viability, and continuity. They put a stop to the defeats of the people 
and forced more cautious attitudes on the capitalists of the epicenters and the 
neighborhoods of popular uprisings. As a result, Latin America has become a 
point of reference for all the world’s social movements. This interest is obvious 
in any forum in which views about experiences of struggle are exchanged. The 
South American actions indicated paths of resistance to the suffocation imposed 
by payment of the foreign debt and the structural adjustments of the 
International Monetary Fund. They have shown how to implement an audit of 
the debt and how to protect reserves in the face of capital flight.
The scale of this Latin American resistance can be clarified by international 
comparisons. The contrast with the Arab rebellions is telling. There, too, neo-
liberalism had increased unemployment, made work precarious, and pushed 
the dispossessed into a democratic struggle against semidictatorial regimes. 
The United States assigns the same strategic importance to the Middle East as 
it does to the South of the American hemisphere, plunders the natural resources 
of the two regions with the same impunity, and attempts to exercise the same 
military supervision in both. For this reason, anti-imperialism awakens the 
same sympathies in the Middle East as in Latin America. But the people of 
Latin America have not suffered the warlike destruction and bloodshed expe-
rienced by the Arab world. They have managed to recreate nationalist, progres-
sive, and leftist projects that have declined in the Middle East and have 
preserved historical secular traditions in contrast to the theocratic tutelage that 
gained prominence in the Arab region. While Latin America has been able to 
sustain its democratic victories, the Arab world is suffering a counteroffensive 
of imperialism and reactionary Islamism that threatens to bury the hopes that 
emerged during the Arab Spring in sectarian wars (Katz, 2013).
A comparison with Southern Europe is also instructive, given that various 
countries of that region suffer from the same adjustments imposed on Latin 
America during the past decade. They support the same creditor bank rescues 
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and the same transfer of bankrupt companies to the states. The deflationary 
policies applied in Greece and Portugal repeat the vicious circle of adjustment 
that tore up South America. However, the rebellions that brought down the 
neoliberal presidents and imposed social agendas in South America have not 
so far been repeated there. On the Old Continent they have to govern with the 
complex monetary mechanism of the euro in the midst of fascist threats and 
national issues more controversial than those of their American counterparts.
conTinuiTies and changes
The period ushered in with the rebellions of the new century continues 
today. The great convulsion that led to the fall of six governments (2000–2005) 
was followed by a phase of greater stability (2005–2008) and then by a period 
of new mobilizations (2009–2013). The general reaction to the collapses created 
by indebtedness and privatizations has been replaced by more varied and dif-
ferentiated demands. In some areas, the battle against the plunder of natural 
resources (Peru, Ecuador) occupies the position held in the past decade by 
opposition to the IMF. In other countries there have been mobilizations against 
the expense of transport (Brazil), the cost of education (Chile), and the invasion 
of agricultural imports (Colombia).
The situation may be summed up by the results obtained in the four coun-
tries that were at the forefront of the great rebellions. In Venezuela the right has 
resorted to every possible path to win back the government and failed again 
and again. It has attempted coups, conspiracies, and sabotage and lost 18 of the 
19 elections held in the past 14 years. While social improvements continue, each 
of the elections has been a great battle against the right. This same continuity 
of social-democratic advances is seen in Bolivia in the context of the new con-
stitution of the plurinational state. The level of combativeness, radicalism, and 
prominence of the grassroots sectors is very high and includes conflicts with 
the only president to have emerged from a social movement. In Ecuador this 
kind of conflict has resulted in the withdrawal of the indigenous movements 
that led the revolts, but the right has remained isolated and has few expecta-
tions of recovering the government in a context of political stability and some 
social improvement. Finally, the prominence in the rebellions of Argentina’s 
unemployed and middle class has been replaced by that of organized workers 
in a framework of continued vitality of street protests and grassroots capacity 
to impose conquests.
The limits that the neoliberal assault is confronting in these four countries 
facilitate resistance in other nations. The struggle of Chilean students persists 
as a central event after various cycles of mass protest. The demand for free 
quality education has penetrated deep into the population and threatens the 
continuism pursued by the governments of the Concertación. The agrarian 
strikes in Colombia against food imports that are ruining small producers have 
the same anti-neoliberal influence. This protest clashes with the free-trade 
agreement in one of the countries most committed to trade liberalization and 
produces serious arm wrestling in a sensitive area for the ruling classes. The 
same is occurring in Peru with the defense of the environment against the 
destruction generated by mega-mining. The importance of this activity for 
Peruvian capitalism explains the brutality of the official reaction.
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The main news of 2013 was the awakening of a giant in Brazil, with mobili-
zations that brought together a million people. The immediate response to the 
criminalization of protest illustrated the new democratic awareness in the face 
of repression. The bus fare increase was stopped, and the protests managed to 
impose a new agenda for public transport and public health care. A better-
educated new generation, occupying the void left by the old activists, has ques-
tioned the wasteful spending on the World Cup. These marches put an end to 
the ebbing of the struggle in Brazil and placed the country in sync with the 
region (Antunes, 2013).
The state of social struggle in Central America differs substantially from that 
in the South of the continent. There have been no significant achievements 
there. On the contrary, capital’s offensive against labor predominates. Mexico 
is the most obvious case of this situation. The country has been battered by 
rural depopulation, massive out-migration, the defeat of the miners, and the 
difficulties of the teachers’ struggle. Impotence in the face of labor flexibility 
prevails in a context of state terrorism and the savagery of narcotrafficking. The 
flag raised in Chiapas 20 years ago persists as a symbol of resistance but has not 
been projected to the rest of the nation (Almeyra, 2013).
The explosive social conditions of this area may, however, generate an abrupt 
turn toward popular rebellion, especially in the countries that that are recover-
ing from the terrible legacy of the 1980s massacres. Since the signing of the 
peace agreements in 2006 there has been a great movement for justice and pun-
ishment of the oppressors of the massacres committed in the past in Guatemala. 
Another type of resistance is erupting in the places most affected by the aggres-
sion of the ultra-neoliberal presidents. For example, in Panama in 2012 there 
was a massive uprising against the privatization of land in Colón. The key 
battle of Central America is being waged in Honduras, where a vast resistance 
movement has eroded the power of the coup supporters. Heroically confront-
ing the assassinations, persecutions, and intimidations of a criminal regime 
managed by the Yankee embassy, the people, though unable to break the con-
tinuity imposed by the right through fraudulent elections, managed to estab-
lish a pole of opposition of enormous magnitude. The contagion of Venezuela 
has been crucial in Honduras and influences all of Central America and the 
Caribbean. Venezuela acts as a nexus between the most vanguard grassroots 
actions of the South and the most reserved of the North. The transmission of 
experiences from one region to another is increasing, together with a growing 
popular perception of a common Latin American identity.
This advance in regional awareness is a direct result of the rebellions. None 
of the revolts evolved into a triumphant revolution, but the ruling classes could 
not resume the offensive or destroy the social balance of power created by 
grassroots action. Although many countries have continued to distance them-
selves from the resistance, new segments of workers have joined the protests. 
This balance of forces is taken into account by the post-neoliberal thesis for 
characterizing the current stage but without distinguishing its impacts in dif-
ferent countries. The incidence of popular victories is much more blurred in the 
thesis of commodities consensus, which suggests the existence of a uniform 
regional scenario that is little affected by grassroots actions.
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The imporTance of cuba and venezuela
The Latin American rebellions had two decisive consequences: they breathed 
new life into the Cuban Revolution and encouraged the emergence of radical 
governments in Venezuela and Bolivia. During the 1990s, Cuba heroically 
resisted isolation and imperial aggression, and this reinforced its status as sym-
bol of emancipation. It managed to maintain the socialist ideal alive in the face 
of embargoes and assaults that would have brought down the majority of polit-
ical regimes in a matter of days. The change in the balance of power in the 
region and U.S. failures mitigated the siege of the island and revived its geopo-
litical position.
Cuba is going through a great transformation. The collapse of the USSR and 
the pro-capitalist turn in China have created a new global scenario that con-
firms the impossibility of generating socialism in isolation in a small place in 
the Caribbean. Cuba has shown that this project allows an economy with few 
resources to reach higher levels of education, lower infant mortality, and greater 
life expectancy than in the rest of the region. It is a country without hunger, 
organized delinquency, or school leaving. However, its economy, shaped with 
the expectation of participating in the global advance of socialism, has had to 
confront abrupt changes in the international context and to survive by accept-
ing tourism, the foreign exchange market, and an undesired expansion of social 
inequality. Now it has embarked on a market reform to reactivate the economy 
while avoiding a return to capitalism. These changes are risky, but lack of action 
is a worse option and the combination of cooperatives and small private busi-
nesses under continued state primacy will permit a counterbalance to current 
difficulties. Changes will continue to unfold, anticipating the maturation of 
anticapitalism in Latin America (Katz, 2014).
These perspectives are feasible with the consolidation of anti-imperialist 
governments that confront serious conflicts with the ruling classes in a context 
of great social mobilization. Venezuela is the epicenter of these experiences. The 
Bolivarian process has introduced progressive transformations without eradi-
cating the bourgeois state and capitalist relations of property. This is not the 
first time in history that an intermediate model of this type has been attempted, 
but what is novel is how long it has lasted. Chavismo has shown renewed vital-
ity without Chávez. In December 2013 it obtained an unexpected electoral tri-
umph (in 15 of the 24 capitals and 76 percent of the municipalities) facing a 
divided right, with its leader Henrique Capriles being too discredited and 
weakened to attempt a recall.5 The right tried everything and achieved nothing. 
It failed with the coup, with electoral demagoguery, and with the pretense of 
Bolivarianism. Nicolás Maduro is working to overcome the enormous gap left 
by Chávez’s death, and a new militant generation, more politicized and expe-
rienced in the battles of the past decade, has begun to emerge.
The Bolivarian continuity is explained by the persistence of social reforms 
that permitted significant achievements in the reduction of poverty (from 60 
percent to 26.7 percent) and malnutrition (3.7 percent), declining unemploy-
ment (6.2 percent), and widespread incidence of “missions” (72 percent of 
households have some social assistance) (Guerrero, 2013; López, 2012). The 
Chávez project has resumed the initiative, with measures of economic 
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intervention to contain runaway inflation (54 percent at mid-year 2013). It con-
fronts the same sabotage of mark-ups, shortages, and flight of dollars endured 
by Salvador Allende. The big capitalists are not only seeking revenge but hop-
ing to regain management of oil revenues, which currently go largely to social 
spending. But the economic disorder also serves the millionaires of the corrupt 
boliburguesía (those who became rich under Chávez), who profit from market 
intermediation and large-scale speculation. The oil cash that the government 
administers should facilitate its action, but the enemy operates from within and 
periodically corners Chavismo with currency and financial maneuvers. The 
economists and activists who promote strengthening controls and making 
them transparent are outlining a way to guide the process toward a socialist 
path, but they are confronted with proposals of adaptation to capitalist adjust-
ment and defection (Dieterich, 2013; Marea Socialista, 2013; Pérez, 2013; Zúñiga, 
2013).
dispuTes in bolivia
Evo Morales leads another radical government that emerged from grass-
roots rebellion, but he governs a country very different from Venezuela. An 
enormous degree of poverty, economic backwardness, and a limited domestic 
market prevail in the altiplano, and in addition the country has a weak political 
structure and a very incomplete state that is incapable of bringing together the 
nationalities that its territory contains. The new plurinational constitution has 
begun to reverse racist elitism and to establish rights that were long overdue. 
Morales has reaffirmed his leadership by steadily increasing the electoral base 
of the organizations that support him (54 percent in 2005, 67 percent in 2008, 64 
percent in 2009). He will soon contend for his third term with a solid rural 
foundation and important backing in the cities. He has been able to achieve 
some social improvement with the income the state gets from exports since the 
nationalizations (Stefanoni, 2013).
The current government of Bolivia has a foreign policy that is very critical of 
the United States (lacking an ambassador since 2008, expelling USAID, with-
drawing from the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes). 
It has also managed to weaken the right-wing opposition, which vacillates 
between making deals and revisiting failed conspiracies. The great tradition of 
grassroots struggle that exists in the country has not declined, and mobiliza-
tions of health workers and teachers, miners, and indigenous people continue. 
The continuity of these movements tends to recreate the old image of an ungov-
ernable country beset by state anomie and endemic and unresolvable conflict. 
When demands have popular support, the government usually negotiates (as 
with the opposition to the road through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and 
Indigenous Territory) or retreats (as with the proposed fuel increases). These 
vacillations express the undefined aspects of the process, which on the one 
hand promotes neo-developmental capitalist modernization and on the other 
aims to forge an egalitarian society. As does Maduro in Venezuela, Morales 
commands a government in dispute between the promoters of these two 
perspectives.
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Some sectors disillusioned with the administration have opted for severe 
criticism. They argue that Morales has embraced neoliberal extractivism, 
encouraging harmful mining contracts with foreign gas companies and sup-
porting the construction of roads that damage the environment. The character-
ization of a government should not, however, be based solely on environmental 
variables, which do not by themselves determine the relevant social facts. In 
addition, the policy on natural resources that Bolivia should implement will 
differ significantly from its German or Swedish equivalent. The altiplano 
urgently needs to use its assets in a sustainable way to overcome underdevel-
opment.
The cosTs of uncerTainTy
Some governments in the radical sphere are implementing policies that are 
more social-democratic. Ecuador is an example of this position. Rafael Correa 
has attempted capitalist modernization to optimize the function of the state 
without introducing structural changes. He has maintained the concentration 
of land in agriculture (where 5 percent of landowners hold 52 percent of the 
land) and the power of the big corporations (where 62 groups manage 41 per-
cent of the GDP). The profits of these sectors have increased significantly (by 
54 percent in 2004–2009) in a framework of continued economic predominance 
of oil, remittances, coffee, bananas, cacao, and shrimp (Machado, 2012). The 
government initially adopted the agenda of the rebellion led by the social 
movements, rejecting the free-trade agreement, closing the Yankee base in 
Manta, and authorizing a new constitution. Then it attenuated the reformist 
trend and limited itself to the use of the significant increase in tax revenues to 
strengthen social welfare. Promoting the concept of “living well,” it increased 
social investment from 0.35 percent in 2006 to 3.82 percent in 2011 (Houtart, 
2012; Ogaz, 2013).
Correa’s overwhelming triumph in the elections of February 2013 inspired 
opposing forecasts. Some analysts (e.g., Borón, 2013c) argued that the demoli-
tion of the business right (Lasso, Noboa) opened the way for implementing the 
progressive agenda (press law, agrarian reform, penal code) with solid congres-
sional support. Others (e.g., Martínez, 2013; see also Rosero, 2013) highlight the 
consolidation of strongman leadership (caudillismo), the revitalization of the 
army, and the increasing appointment of conservative officials to the detriment 
of radical figures.
Nicaragua offers another variant of this combination of radical positioning 
in the foreign sphere and a center-left strategy in the domestic. Daniel Ortega 
has recently obtained another great electoral triumph, broadening the support 
that he had received in the previous elections. Now he can govern without 
opposition, shelving the pact that allowed him to return in 2006 through elec-
toral reform agreed to by the right. He continues to benefit from the memory of 
the disastrous management of the conservatives of 1997–2001 and the persis-
tent division that prevails in the area (Alemán vs. Bolaño). The current 
Sandinismo is, however, light years away from the old Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional. It has become structured around a family-business group 
of Ortega’s that enters into agreements with the IMF, grants privileges to banks, 
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and penalizes abortion to build closer relations with the Church (López, 2011). 
The conflicts with the local oligarchs and the firm policy confronting the United 
States position Ortega opposite to the right, but his vigorous abandonment of 
the revolutionary past alienates him from the radical spectrum. The contrast 
between his discourse and his practice is enormous. He has traveled a very dif-
ferent path from the rest of the Latin American leaders, accepting the status quo 
and opting for a definite break with the original Sandinismo.
El Salvador presents a more complex situation. After many years of war and 
ultrareactionary presidencies, a coalition supported by the old guerrilla leader-
ship of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional came to power 
in 2009. However, a journalist without a militant past, Mauricio Funes, was left 
in charge of the presidency, and he preserved neoliberal economic manage-
ment, NAFTA, and the dollar as currency. He also embarked on a love affair 
with the United States that included participation in foreign operations and 
ministers allied with the State Department. The narrow margin for action that 
such a small country enjoys is obvious, as is its dependence on remittances (18 
percent of GDP), which help 70 percent of families survive, but the government 
accepts these constraints as inevitable and reinforces an oppressive social order. 
Some analysts hold that the right is beginning to achieve in the postwar era 
what it could not obtain in 20 years of bloody battles. It is consolidating its 
interests and the privileges of the powerful (Calvo, 2012; Gutiérrez, 2014).
A more conclusive example of political frustration can be seen in Paraguay 
because of the timidity of former President Lugo. When the right demanded 
his resignation, he gathered up his belongings and went home, offering no 
resistance to the coup. The contrast with the valiant attitude of Correa or Zelaya 
was enormous. Even Mercosur’s diplomatic inquiry into the coup was stronger 
than the deposed leader’s reaction. His conduct crowned an administration 
characterized by vacillation. He failed to advance agrarian reform in a country 
in which 85 percent of the land was in the hands of 2 percent of the owners and 
peasants were being driven out by the expansion of soy cultivation. He acted 
as the typical conciliator, and this ended up strengthening the right as the social 
movements became disorganized and demoralized. The avoidance of radical-
ization and reforms that capitalism would not tolerate has led to frustration, 
halting the advance of the left and facilitating the return of the right.
The dawning of The alba
To confront the siege deployed by U.S. corporations and banks, Venezuela 
and Cuba created the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America—ALBA), agreeing to 
exchange a greater supply of oil from Venezuela for education and health ser-
vices from Cuba and later extending this principle to a wide range of products. 
The countries that later became incorporated into the association (Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Antigua, San Vicente, and Grenada) instituted the same 
mechanisms. They have introduced forms of cooperation between economies 
that prioritize social well-being over business profits. This criterion facilitates 
a very different project from the initiatives for Latin American integration 
based on competition and the market. In the political field, the ALBA has 
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assumed an anti-imperialist stance. It proposes to break with submission to the 
United States to strengthen sovereignty and facilitate grassroots progress.
In contrast to the free-trade agreements and Mercosur, the ALBA is incon-
ceivable without a base in radical or revolutionary governments. There is a 
strong correspondence between the Latin American bloc under construction 
and the presidencies of the left. The ALBA could not survive without those 
national pillars, given that no ruling class would maintain the association if it 
recovered control of the government. The ALBA and its complements (such as 
Telesur) have a future if they cultivate anticapitalist components, but its imme-
diate consolidation is limited by the severe underdevelopment of the econo-
mies that are participating in this initiative. There is only one country with 
significant resources (Venezuela), and having oil wealth is not the same as hav-
ing a medium-sized economy or an industrial base. There is an abyss between 
it and the economies of the central powers and an enormous gap between it and 
those of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.
The Bolivarian governments have implemented a very progressive use of oil 
in foreign exchange. They assist the economies and populations that are most 
in need with measures aimed at undermining imperial domination. This action 
does not, however, generate economic development on its own or eradicate the 
backwardness of poverty-stricken countries. In addition to sponsoring valu-
able exchange initiatives, the ALBA has created a new common currency (the 
sucre) counter to the neoliberal model of the euro. The effective realization of 
this project will require more than this, but what is important is the identifica-
tion of an economic agenda that is a potential alternative for the entire region 
and promotes new treaties among its members (such as Petrocaribe or Eco-
ALBA). Members of this bloc will have to walk a tightrope. Venezuela, for 
example, became a member of Mercosur by defeating the veto exercised by the 
United States through Paraguay, but this meant accepting the adverse competi-
tion of duty-free goods imported from Brazil.
In the geopolitical field, the ALBA governments have played a salutary role 
with permanent initiatives against the U.S. military presence. Their support of 
Honduras’s resistance, humanitarian aid to Haiti, and sponsorship of the peace 
negotiations in Colombia are three very important recent examples. They have 
also played the vanguard role in support of those persecuted for exercising 
freedom of the press. Ecuador offered asylum to Assange, confronting the 
United States and Britain’s crusade to silence the communicator who revealed 
the great manipulations of diplomacy. Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 
opened their doors in welcome to Snowden, the other whistleblower perse-
cuted for showing the world how the imperial networks of espionage operate. 
Solidarity has been extended to governments that endure bombardments of 
slander by the great networks of global communication.
Mercosur and the ALBA are two very different projects despite occupying 
common spaces (such as the CELAC and the UNASUR). The former seeks to 
remodel capitalism around more autonomous regional supports while the lat-
ter mobilizes anti-imperialist action with the contours of postcapitalism. This 
divergence has translated into contrasting attitudes toward grassroots inter-
vention. In contrast to the governments of Mercosur, the presidents of the 
ALBA usually complement the meetings of their leaders with militant 
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discussion forums (“people’s summits”). The ALBA’s recent establishment of 
its Social Movements Assembly reflects this conception of grassroots construc-
tion. Its participants are a generation of activists that is explicitly rehabilitating 
socialism and openly challenging capitalism, and they have begun to formulate 
proposals for continental action to advance toward Latin American integration, 
achieving financial, food, and natural resource sovereignty (Movimientos 
Sociales del ALBA, 2013).
responses To The debaTe
The characterization of a third bloc of revolutionary and radical govern-
ments allows us to clarify the opposition suggested between the post-neoliberal 
and the commodities consensus views. Undoubtedly, the anti-imperialist axis 
brought together in the ALBA promotes a head-on collision with neoliberalism. 
It is counterposed not only to the free-trade and reactionary bloc of the Pacific 
but also to the capitalist regionalism led by Brazil. Post-neoliberal status would 
apply only to this radical segment rather than to the whole of South America. 
The notion of post-neoliberalism would erroneously equate the ALBA with 
Mercosur and overlook the qualitative difference between the radical presi-
dents (Maduro, Morales) and those of the center-left (Rousseff, Kirchner).
These inconsistencies derive from a confused use of the concept of post-
neoliberalism. The notion is employed in so many senses to allude to such a 
diversity of situations that it ends up navigating in ambiguity. It is unclear 
whether it applies to governments, periods, or patterns of accumulation, and it 
does not clarify the economic policies that are in vogue, which often vary with 
the conjuncture and may be more or less heterodox in response to the global 
crisis. In its most common usage, “post-neoliberalism” identifies a period sub-
sequent to and replacing the Washington Consensus, but it emphasizes the 
political turn toward autonomy, overlooking the persistence of the economic 
model generated during the previous phase.
The opposing characterization, commodities consensus, highlights the 
extractivism that prevails throughout the region and is endorsed by govern-
ments of different types that have replaced financial valorization with submis-
sion to mining, oil, and soy. In contrast to post-neoliberalism, it plays down 
policy changes and highlights the conservative economic convergence. The 
idea of commodities consensus commits an error symmetrical to the overvalu-
ing of progressive political shifts. It does not recognize the intense divergences 
among right-wing, center-left, and radical governments in all the areas that are 
not part of the specialization in basic exports. The main difficulty appears at the 
moment of explaining the positions on social reforms adopted by a radical 
political axis based on primary mono-exports. Venezuela has not managed to 
eradicate the preeminence of oil, Bolivia has not liberated itself from the cen-
trality of mining or gas, and Cuba has increased its ties to nickel and tourism, 
but did this dependence turn Chávez, Morales, and Fidel Castro into presidents 
like Fox, Uribe, or Garcia? The confusions in this area lead to characterizations 
that mechanically identify the influence of agro-exports and mining with the 
increase in political dependency or neocolonialism. In the most extreme cases, 
Morales is presented as an “extractivist neoliberal” and Correa as an “agent of 
transnational capital.” Extractivism is a concept that is well suited to illustrating 
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particular features of the Latin American economy. These characteristics condi-
tion the pattern of reproduction but do not describe the character of a political 
regime or the nature of a government.
dimensions in conflicT
To evaluate what has occurred in the past decade one has to integrate the two 
dimensions of the ongoing processes. The political transformations in the 
region emerged in a framework of continued primary-export specialization. 
There is both greater diversity of governments and more prevalence of the 
same model of reproduction. The post-neoliberalism-vs.-commodities-consen-
sus paradigm does not examine this contradiction. Both concepts contain part 
of the truth but do not explain the regional scenario. To understand why 
Venezuela and Mexico travel such different paths in similar contexts one has to 
distinguish the economic aspects from the political-social determinants. The 
pattern of reproduction accounts for the structure of production and interna-
tional position of each economy, but the governments should be characterized 
in terms of other evidence. They emerge from the history and political tradition 
of each country in correspondence with the needs of their ruling classes and the 
outcomes of social struggles. The two dimensions are linked and the changes 
in one area directly impact the other, but these changes do not have the same 
rhythm or the same direction. In the past decade the great political transforma-
tions of Latin America have had a very limited effect on the economic sphere. 
They have disrupted the national context of certain countries without altering 
their reproductive schemes.
This result confirms that the action of a government has limited effects on 
capitalist accumulation. A right-wing administration completely conforms to 
the neoliberal pillar, a center-left administration confronts conflicts, and a rad-
ical process clashes with these principles, producing harmony in one case, 
coexistence in another, and counterposition in the third. However, the modifi-
cation of an economic model and an international position goes far beyond 
presidents and their economic policies. It is important to differentiate these 
levels of analysis to integrate them into a totalizing characterization. Grassroots 
triumphs against neoliberalism do not determine a post-neoliberal landscape, 
and continued primary-export specialization does not result in a common sta-
tus for all governments.
The lack of synchronization between politics and the economy that is seen in 
Latin America derives from the recent incidence of victorious popular rebel-
lions, which limited the regressive effects of neoliberalism without halting it. 
The dualities of the region are explained by the dynamic of uprisings that were 
not defeated but also did not become triumphant anticapitalist revolutions. 
This intermediate result is reflected in the variety of governments. Duality is 
not, however, synonymous with lack of definition, and the conflict of trends 
must be resolved. The ALBA governments can reach their progressive goals 
only if they radicalize, confront the ruling classes, and begin to eradicate the 
primary-export model. The key to this turn is found in the revolutionary trans-
formation of the state. If this turn is delayed, the dominant will have time to 
destroy or neutralize the radical experiments. The response to the initial question 
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about the more autonomous or dependent character of Latin America will be 
settled by these outcomes. The dualities of the region cannot become perma-
nent. Ultimately they will tip the scales toward a stormy adaptation to capital-
ist oppression or a new development of socialism.
noTes
1. Remittances have generated a lucrative business for exchange agencies (Western Union, 
Thomas Cook, MoneyGram). Transfers to developing countries worldwide were more than 
US$332 billion in 2010 and US$372 billion in 2011 and were estimated to reach US$467 billion by 
2014 (La Nación, September 24, 2012).
2. The turn implied greater subordination of the national bourgeoisie to foreign capital and the 
consequent disinclination to implement progressive changes (Santos, 1998).
3. The richest 1 percent receives 31 percent of the income, while the richest 5 percent receive 
257 times more than the poorest 5 percent (Brum, 2013; Quijano, 2013).
4. After the conflict over espionage, U.S. corporations were left out of the bidding for the great 
Libra oilfields and the pro–North American Patriota wing lost ground to the critical Amorim-
Figueiredo sector. For two opposing assessments of the aircraft purchase decision, see Borón 
(2013b) and Zibechi (2013).
5. The massive participation of the electorate in the Venezuelan elections has been decisive and 
is one great channel for grassroots action, in contrast to the situation in Chile, where much of the 
population has lost confidence in the utility of the vote.
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